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Abstract: In June 2019, the European Union and MErcosUr reached a political 
agreement in order to sign a comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA), which 
aims to increase interregional trade and to further develop cooperation in non-
commercial areas, such as food security and labor regulations. The EU has a 
normative power through which it intends to export its values and standards. 
Upon the ratification of this agreement, MERCOSUR and its Member States will 
certainly need to reform their legal orders so as to align themselves with the 
food security international standards such as the International Union for the 
Protection of New Plant Varieties. It may also have an impact upon intellectual 
property regulations. Labor standards constitute another key aspect of the 
non-commercial interests of this agreement. In order to avoid social dumping, 
the EU may require MERCOSUR Member States to ratify ILO Conventions such 
as the 87 – which has not been ratified by Brazil yet – in order to guarantee a 
level playing field. Since the final text is currently being discussed, the impact 
of this agreement will largely depend upon the political will of both parties. 
Resumen: En junio de 2019, la Unión Europea y MErcosUr acordaron 
firmar un acuerdo integral de libre comercio (TLC). Su objetivo es aumentar 
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el comercio interregional y desarrollar aún más la cooperación en áreas no 
comerciales tales como la seguridad alimentaria y la normativa laboral. La UE 
dispone de un poder normativo a través del cual aspira a exportar sus valores 
y estándares al resto del planeta. Por consiguiente, tras la ratificación de este 
acuerdo, MErcosUr y, por ende, sus Estados miembros se verán obligados 
a reformar sus ordenamientos jurídicos. La seguridad alimentaria puede 
llevar a los Estados miembros del MErcosUr a alinearse con la normativa 
internacional de la materia como aquélla relativa a la Unión Internacional 
para la Protección de las Obtenciones Vegetales (UPOV). Asimismo, puede 
tener un impacto sobre la regulación concerniente a la propiedad intelectual. 
La normativa laboral constituye otro aspecto clave de los intereses no 
comerciales de este acuerdo. Para evitar el”dumping social”, la UE puede 
exigir a los Estados miembros del MERCOSUR que adopten determinados 
convenios de la OIT tales como el 87 - que aún no ha sido adoptado por 
Brasil - para garantizar igualdad de condiciones. Dado que el texto final se 
encuentra actualmente sometido a negociación, el impacto de este acuerdo 
dependerá en gran medida de la voluntad política de las partes.
Keywords: European Union, MERCOSUR, food fecurity, labor regulations, 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
Palabras clave: Unión Europea, MERCOSUR, seguridad alimentaria, normativa 
laboral, acuerdo de libre comercio (ALC).
1. INTRODUCTION
In June 2019, the European Union (EU) and MErcosUr reached 
a political agreement (henceforth “Agreement”) in order to sign a 
comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA)1. This dates back to 1992 when 
MERCOSUR and the then European Communities signed an Interregional 
Framework Cooperation Agreement that aimed at strengthening trade 
between both regions in order to guarantee the competitive integration 
of MERCOSUR into the world economy and the consolidation of the EU 
presence in the region2. Specifically, relying upon the EU’s experience in 
regional integration, it intended to strengthen the institutional dimension 
of MERCOSUR. Subsequently, there were multiple bilateral contacts to 
further cooperation and dialogue that made it possible to establish a lasting 
relationship between the two blocs.
This was followed by the 1995 Interregional Framework Cooperation 
Agreement between the European community and its Member states and 
MErcosUr and its Member states in order to increase interregional trade 
1 New EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement. The agreement in principle. Brussels, 1 July 2019, see: 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/june/tradoc_157964.pdf> 
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Relaciones Unión Europea-MERCOSUR: Antecedentes. Available 
at: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/MEMO_95_168> 
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and further develop cooperation in other areas. It also aimed to develop the 
political dialogue and the institutional development of MERCOSUR3. 
The MERCOSUR integration process was supported by the EU from the 
very beginning. One of the first movements in this regard was the signing of 
an inter-institutional cooperation agreement in 1992.
Both the EU and MERCOSUR, in addition to being two of the leading 
regions in agricultural production and trade, also have extensive experience 
in the mutual exchange of goods, services, investment and cooperation. 
The relevance of the Agreement is crucial due to several aspects: its size, 
thematic scope, and political significance. It includes commitments on trade, 
cooperation, and political dialogue and creates a market of 778 million 
inhabitants4.
The interests of MErcosUr focus on the opportunity to improve its 
position in the international scene and to have access to the EU market, 
whilst the main objective of the EU is to gain access to other markets and to 
boost its economy. In addition, the weight of the European bloc foreign direct 
investment (FDI) on MERCOSUR as well as the preferential access of the EU 
to a market of more than 295 million people are crucial elements that push 
both parties to sign a legally binding agreement5. 
Today, the EU is one of the biggest investment and trading partners of 
MERCOSUR with a cumulative investment stock in the region that has gone 
from €130 billion in 2000 to €381 billion in 2017. MERCOSUR’s exports to the 
EU were €35,9 billion in 2019, mainly in agricultural products such as food, 
beverages and tobacco (21,2%), plant products like soy and coffee (17,4%), 
and meat and other animal products (6,5%). Exports of services to the EU 
amounted to €10 billion in 20186. EU exports in goods to the four MERCOSUR 
countries totaled €41 billion in 2019: machinery (28,6%), transport equipment 
(12,7%), chemical and pharmaceutical products (24,2%). As for the services 
sector, the EU exported €21 billion of services to the Latin American bloc7.
The EU has signed FTAs with different countries and regional 
organizations across the world — such as Switzerland (1972), Norway (1992), 
Mexico (1997), Chile (2002), and Japan (2018). The Agreement is timely as it 
was reached against a backdrop of increasing deterioration in multilateralism 
due to the growing importance of protectionism measures8. In 2018, almost 
3 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and 
Mercosur, 15 Dec. 1995 - Joint Declaration on political dialogue between the European Union 
and Mercosur, IO L 69, 19 Mar. 1996.
4 DE AZEVEDO, Belisario et al. “Acuerdo de Asociación Mercosur-Unión Europea”. In Instituto 
para la Integración de América Latina y el Caribe Sector de Integración y Comercio. Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo, 2019, Nota Técnica, nº IDB-TN-01701, p. 3.
5 MERCOSUR. En pocas palabras. Available at: <https://www.mercosur.int/quienes-somos/
en-pocas-palabras/>
6 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Mercosur. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/>
7 Idem.
8 TIMINI, Jacopo et al. “The EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement: Main Features and Economic 
Impact”. Banco de España, Eurosistema. Analytical articles. Economic Bulletin. 2020, n° 1, p. 1.
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a third of trade between Europe and the rest of the world was covered by 
the preferential provisions of an FTA. This figure is expected to increase 
significantly in 2020, following the entry into force of the agreement with 
Vietnam, and to rise in the coming years to more than 40% if the agreement 
currently being negotiated with MERCOSUR and the United Kingdom comes 
into force. However, the COVID-19 crisis may constitute a significant challenge.
Originally, FTAs sought exclusively to further increase trade. However, 
since the 1990s and particularly the 2000s, the EU has also pursued objectives 
other than trade, such as political, social, and cultural goals. The EU does not 
only aim to expand its markets: it has a normative power through which it 
intends to export its values and standards to other countries. The EU has 
excelled in employing soft power policies, attracting allies through European 
values, such as democracy and human rights. This paper focuses on some 
of the non-commercial interests of the Agreement and particularly on two 
specific areas: food security and labor.
Food security is a sensitive area as MERCOSUR constitutes one of the 
biggest producers and exporters of food in the world. This has created some 
internal conflicts within the EU because some agricultural countries, such 
as France, Poland, and Ireland, have called into question this Agreement 
given the possible unfair competition. It has been argued that MERCOSUR 
Member states may not comply with certain measures related to sanitary 
and Phytosanitary (SPS), which could lower their costs of food production 
and could put EU consumers at risk. SPS measures are strongly linked to 
the trade dimension, since in many cases they represent Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) by which counterparties to international agreements seek 
subterfuges. However, by their nature, they also aim to ensure food security 
within countries and to ultimately protect citizens’ health. This article 
addresses specifically the non-commercial aspect of food security and the 
legal challenges that the adoption of the Agreement may entail.
Another crucial area in this non-commercial dimension is labor rights. 
It is well-known that cheap labor is sometimes used as a way to improve 
the competitiveness of countries by reducing labor standards. This is all the 
more the case when one party, such as some EU countries, may be more 
competitive due to technology and a highly skilled labor force. This may push 
some MERCOSUR Member States to reduce the cost of production by making 
labor cheaper through the reform in pejus of labor standards. Unsurprisingly, 
a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter has been included in the 
Agreement, which aims to guarantee, inter alia, fundamental labor rights 
within both organizations.
A caveat is in order: given the fact that this is not the final agreement, 
there are many details that remain to be discussed and agreed between the 
parties. However, this is not an obstacle to examine the existing provisions 
enshrined in the political agreement and their possible impact and 
consequences in the event of a definitive signature of an FTA.
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This paper starts off by exploring the nature, structure, and content 
of the Agreement. It then explores the concept of food safety and the 
possible implications for the EU and particularly for the MERCOSUR Member 
States. Furthermore, this article examines how the Trade and Sustainable 
Development Chapter may contribute to reshape labor regulations within 
MERCOSUR and its Member States legal orders. 
2. THE EU-MERCOSUR AGREEMENT WITHIN THE DIVERSE REGIONAL 
EXTERNAL POLICIES
2.1. EU and MERCOSUR External Policies
The relationship between the EU and Latin America has been built 
and developed over decades. Unsurprisingly, different types of bilateral 
and multilateral agreements have been reached between the EU and Latin 
American countries. The EU and Mercosur have signed a ‘new generation’ 
(or fourth generation) agreement9, which covers topics that go beyond 
purely traditional trade issues. These FTAs incorporate political dialogue and 
cooperation and include new areas such as intellectual property, science 
and technology, environmental and labor matters. This is related to the so-
called ‘Global Europe’ trade strategy that explicitly mentions that FTAs can 
go “further and faster in promoting openness and integration, by tackling 
issues which are not ready for multilateral discussion”10. The EU not only 
develops relations between its Member States at a legal level, but also stands 
as a true subject of international law, with clear foreign policy implications. 
Its regulatory power transcends internal effects and is projected on other 
blocs and regions with which FTAs are negotiated, with first-order legal 
consequences.
The EU signs agreements in order to grow and expand its economy and 
power by accessing third countries’ markets. Similarly, third countries, such 
as MERCOSUR Member States, aim to have access to the EU market. The EU’s 
power is not only limited to trade: the EU has a vocation to promote global 
human rights and, thus, to create a global regulatory framework, which 
includes a social perspective11. It also aims to level the playing field and make 
sure EU firms are not confronted with competitors who do not respect the 
same standards, such as the ILO ones12.
Sanahuja and Rodríguez identifies the EU as an “external federator”13. 
9 GSTOHL, Sieglinde and HANF, Dominik. “The EU ‘s Post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements: 
Commercial Interests in a Changing Constitutional Context”. European Law Journal. 2014, vol 
20, n° 6, p. 733-735.
10 Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/eu-free-trade/>
11 NOVITZ, Tonia. “In Search of a Coherent Social Policy: EU Import and Export of ILO Labour 
Standards?”. In ORBIE, Jan and TORTELL, Lisa (Eds.). The European Union and the Social 
Dimension of Globalization. London: Routledge, 2009.
12 CAMPLING, Liam et al. “Working Beyond the Border? A New Research Agenda for the 
Evaluation of Labour Standards in EU Trade Agreements”. International Labour Review. 2015, 
p. 6-7.
13 SANAHUJA, José Antonio and RODRIGUEZ, Jorge. “Veinte años de negociaciones Unión 
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This means that the EU acts as a real mentor and provides technical and 
institutional capacities to other countries with which it intends to sign 
agreements in order to face the challenges of international trade. Furthermore, 
it attempts to support regional integration processes such as MERCOSUR, 
which comply with characteristics similar to those of the EU integration 
process. The power relationship between the EU and its partners will depend 
upon the context and will be immersed in a situation of interdependence of 
the parties, which will be asymmetric14. 
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, all matters related to the EU Common 
Commercial Policy are included into the sphere of exclusive competence. 
The Treaty defined the Common Trade Policy in the context of the Union’s 
external action (Article 207 Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union). In addition, article 206 reminds us of the contribution of the EU to 
“the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and 
the lowering of customs and other barriers”. Article 21 TEU reinforces this 
dimension as it states that “the Union’s action on the international scene 
shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, 
development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider 
world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles 
of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter and international law”.
The EU external dimension is of utmost importance, especially its 
foreign policy. Other trade blocs also encourage common external action, 
such as ASEAN, which in its Vision 2025 has the objective to become “an 
outward-looking community” that “plays a responsible and constructive role 
globally”15. In this new generation of agreements, such as the EU-Mercosur 
agreement, negotiators must not only focus on eliminating potential barriers 
to trade: it is their task to “facilitate harmonisation of the rules in question 
and hence extend and prolong the advantages achieved as a result of the 
negotiation”16.
Unlike the EU, which looks both inwards and outwards, external 
Europea-Mercosur: Del interregionalismo a la crisis de la globalización”. Fundación Carolina. 
2019. Available at: <https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/DT_
FC_13.pdf> 
14 SANAHUJA, José Antonio. “¿Un mundo unipolar, multipolar o apolar? El poder estructural 
y las transformaciones de la sociedad internacional contemporánea”. In: VV AA (Eds). Cursos 
de Derecho Internacional de Vitoria-Gasteiz 2007. Bilbao: Servicio Editorial de la Universidad 
del País Vasco, 2008. p. 297-384. Available at: <https://eprints.ucm.es/42540/1/Un_mundo_
unipolar_multipolar_o_apolar_E.pdf>
15 MERCED, Louie Dane C. “‘Partners’ for Change: Understanding the External Relations of 
ASEAN”. Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies Commentaries. 2017, vol 4, 
n° 20, p.2
16 BENDINI, Roberto. “The Future of the EU Trade Policy”. Policy Department. European 
Parliament, 2015, p. 15.
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markets have a significant importance for Mercosur Member States17. The 
institutional structure of the MERCOSUR external dimension is rather weak. 
The Treaty of Asunción prescribes that MErcosUr Member states aim to 
adopt a common trade policy for MERCOSUR. This has been confirmed by the 
Council of the Common Market — the highest body of MERCOSUR — Decision 
No 32/00, which sets out that Member States commit themselves to negotiate 
and sign FTAs jointly. Although MERCOSUR’s development throughout 28 
years has been unsteady and incoherent, some trade agreements have been 
signed not just with Latin American countries but also with Asian and African 
countries, as well as other regional organizations18. Furthermore, there are 
ongoing negotiations with Canada, Korea, and China, among others. Even 
though there have been some very recent conflicts regarding the external 
dimension of MERCOSUR — in particular given the position of the Argentine 
government — the EU-MERCOSUR agreement has never been called into 
question and Member States wish to push it forward”.
From a Latin American perspective, initially FTAs were considered 
as “imperialist” tools used either by the United States or the EU to mainly 
protect their (economic) interests19. However, as regional integration 
processes developed, Latin American trade organizations became aware of 
the importance of economic integration with other blocs in order to boost 
the regional economy. This awareness, though, has not been traditionally 
applied to the FTAs signed by Latin American organizations, in particular 
MERCOSUR. They remain “first generation trade agreements, and none of 
them contains explicit clauses of democratic or human rights safeguards”20. 
Nonetheless, this new approach has shaped the internal dimension of Latin 
America regional organizations, whose openness to human rights has been 
mainly caused by the pressure exerted by outside actors21.
2.2. The EU-MERCOSUR Relationship
The EU-MERCOSUR relationship dates back to 1992. MERCOSUR 
Member States have not only historical but also cultural and linguistic ties 
with some countries of the EU22. The primary goal of the 1992 Agreement 
17 MUKHAMETDINOV, Mikhail. Mercosur and the European Union. Variation and Limits of 
Regional Integration. Cambridge, MA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 48.
18 Mercosur has signed, or is still negotiating, agreements with other economic blocs such as 
CAN, SACU, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, the CARICOM, the ASEAN, 
the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship Treaty Agreement, the Community 
of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), and the Central American Integration System 
(SICA). Mercosur is also currently negotiating with EFTA, with which a Declaration on Trade 
and Investment Cooperation and Action Plan was signed. In addition, Mercosur has signed 
some agreements with individual countries such as Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, Cuba, India, Egypt, 
Morocco, Israel, Pakistan, and Colombia.
19 FRANCA FILHO, Toscano et al. “Protection of Fundamental Rights in Latin America FTAs and 
Mercosur: An Explanatory Agenda”. European Law Journal. 2014, vol 20, n° 20(6), p. 811-815.
20 Idem, 822.
21 Idem, 822.
22 FRANCA FILHO, Toscano. “External Relations”. In: FRANCA FILHO, Toscano et al. (Eds.) The 
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was the provision of technical and institutional support. However, it is the 
ambitious interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement signed on 15 
December 199523, which entered into force on 1 July 1999, which has laid 
the formal foundations of this relationship24. This Agreement constitutes an 
“obligation of means, by which the parties look forward to preparing the 
conditions for enabling the interregional free trade area to be created”25. 
Three main areas are to be addressed by the future FTA: trade, political 
dialogue, and cooperation.
The commercial sphere remains the main objective of this Agreement. 
However, it has broadened its horizons by incorporating a strategic political 
and economic association that aims for greater regional integration, not only 
between the EU and MErcosUr, but also between the Member states of 
the latter through the application of common policies for the production, 
importation, and exportation of products. The Agreement recently agreed 
and signed by the parties, if ratified, would become one of the most ambitious 
agreements reached to date by both blocs. There is still a long legal and 
administrative process to go through before final approval26. There are some 
sectors that oppose the Agreement, such as the agricultural sector in the EU 
and the industrial and automobile sector in MErcosUr27. However, given the 
positive economic impact that the signature of the Agreement could entail, 
there are many actors that overtly advocate adopting it.
The EU-MERCOSUR Agreement revolves around three axes: firstly, 
trade and the gradual and progressive liberalization of access to markets. 
Given the fact that MErcosUr Member states are some of the biggest 
exporters of food, one of the key aspects of this Agreement is SPS matters. 
Secondly, cooperation has been crucial for the institutional development 
of MErcosUr as well as the strengthening of certain areas such as labor 
rights. Thirdly, given the period of dictatorships during the 1970s and 1980s, 
political dialogue has been crucial to consolidate democracy in the region. 
MErcosUr, through the Protocol of Ushuaia I (1998) and the Protocol of 
Ushuaia II (2005), has created and reinforced the “democratic clause”, which 
guarantees the respect of democracies in the region by its Member States. 
This has been done under the auspices of the EU and has been applied when 
coups d’état took place in Paraguay in 2013 and in Venezuela in 2017. 
Law of MERCOSUR. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 151.
23 See footnote 5.
24 Decision 1999/279/EC concerning the conclusion of the interregional framework 
cooperation agreement between the European Community and its Member States, and the 
Southern Common Market and its Party States, IO L/112.
25 FRANCA FILHO, Toscano. “External Relations”, p. 153.
26 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. EU and Mercosur reach agreement on trade. Available at: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_3396>
27 “Acuerdo Mercosur-UE: quiénes son los ganadores y los perdedores del nuevo pacto 
comercial”. BBC. July 1, 2019. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-
latina-48833560>
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3. FOOD SECURITY
3.1. Food Security and Food Safety
Food security is globally one of the main challenges. Globalization has 
allowed synergies and has developed tools to achieve greater access to goods 
and services. However, it has worsened many of the endemic problems caused 
by market liberalization, such as inequality and food insecurity. In 2018, 
the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, affirmed that “the increase in 
inequality has become the face of globalization” and it is necessary “a world 
economy that benefits all and creates opportunities for everyone. We need 
to build a fair globalization”28.
Food security also plays a central role in the development and well-
being of the population, especially in the most vulnerable settings. The 2030 
Agenda of the United Nations (UN) in its Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), specifically in SDG 2, includes this. Focused on the development 
of agriculture as an engine of development and the elimination of hunger 
and poverty, this SDG aims to ensure people’s access to and availability of 
nutritious food and to ensure new forms of agricultural productivity that 
improve food security globally, through sustainable and environmentally 
friendly methods29. 
This article relies upon the definition of food security adopted at the 
World Food Summit held in Rome in 1996: “Food security exists when all 
people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe 
and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for 
an active and healthy life”30. This definition has introduced four dimensions 
of food security: physical availability, when people can have food through 
production or trade; economic and physical access, understanding that food 
security is not only achieved through a sufficient supply of food; utilization, 
consumption and preparation of diverse food, combined with good biological 
utilization, that allow for a healthy life; and stability over time of the other 
3 dimensions. Food security cannot be achieved if the 3 dimensions are not 
stable over time and suffer variations (weather conditions, unemployment, 
or political instability)31. A large part of the concept of food safety is also 
included under this definition. This concept is mainly used to describe the SPS 
measures. Since this term encompasses many facets of handling, preparation, 
and storage of food to prevent illness and injury, it is closely related to food 
security.
This can be traced back to the 1995 Interregional Framework 
Agreement, where the bases for future negotiations were set out. More 
28 UNITED NATIONS. El aumento de la desigualdad, el rostro de la globalización. Available at: 
<https://news.un.org/es/story/2018/05/1433082>
29 UNITED NATIONS. Goal 2: Zero Hunger. Available at: <https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/hunger/>
30 FAO. An Introduction to the Basic Concepts of Food Security [online]. EC - FAO Food Security 
Programme, 2008. (Information Document). Available at: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-al936e.pdf>
31 Idem.
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specifically, Article 6 provides that both parties intend to cooperate in 
promoting the closeness of quality standards for agri-food products, industrial 
goods, and certification, in accordance with international criteria. This article 
also states that “[t]he primary aim of cooperation shall be to promote any 
measure which is likely to improve the quality of the Parties’ products and 
businesses”32.
The texts of the Agreement, in principle only refer to food safety; 
however, food security is a wider definition. This concept should cover SPS 
measures but also many of the problems associated with the liberalization 
of markets due to the signature of agreements. These issues result, in many 
cases, in food insecurity, not only because of the overuse of pesticides and 
chemicals but also because of the effects they cause on local communities.
3.2. Food Security under the EU-MERCOSUR Agreement and its legal 
framework
This subsection addresses issues related to how the entry into force 
of the Agreement can influence food security within the EU and MERCOSUR, 
and whether it includes mechanisms for identifying and penalizing practices 
that could result in a breach of it. To do so, policies, regulatory frameworks, 
initiatives, and commitments oriented to food security are analyzed within 
the Agreement. There is an assumption that, in the EU, during the first years 
of the Agreement, the consumer may benefit from lower prices and greater 
competition in products. However, the opposite may occur in MERCOSUR. 
This may be due to the adaptation of the supply and demand of products, 
which would lead the MErcosUr countries to allocate a greater part of 
their agricultural production to export and to incorporate new and more 
rigorous SPS measures, seals and quality certifications and food safety. On 
the other hand, the liberalization of markets would foster greater interest 
in the large-scale production of big agricultural companies that exploit the 
country’s resources for the sole purpose of exporting them. In many cases, 
these companies are foreign, and their land grabbing displaces small farmers 
with family as well as local and more sustainable production systems, which 
could reduce food security and nutrition of the most disadvantaged. On 
the European side, the strict controls required on the products of European 
farmers would be difficult to trace on all MERCOSUR imports without an 
effective system in the countries of origin. This can affect the nutritional and 
healthy qualities of imported food and feed, as well as generate processes of 
unfair and unequal competition.
3.2.1. Paving the way
Although it is clear that food security is covered under the umbrella 
of the Agreement, food safety is more important for the trade pillar and 
the overall interests of the EU. This is an asset that has been included in the 
32 See footnote 5. 
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negotiations and one of the reasons why the EU has been ensuring strong 
sPs measures for the import of food products, not only inside its borders, but 
also beyond them. The EU’s 2007-2013 Regional Strategic Document for the 
MErcosUr region places greater emphasis on the needs of the European 
bloc to reinforce aspects necessary for the proper functioning of the future 
Agreement, which 12 years later, has not been ratified. In this line, it stands 
out that 70% of what the EU contributes (48 million euros) goes to “support 
for the deepening of MERCOSUR and the implementation of the future EU-
MERCOSUR Association Agreement”33, within which food safety and hygiene 
is a priority axis. Another key aspect of this strategy is to consolidate the 
integration of the MERCOSUR countries, as defined in its objectives: “[t]o help 
accelerate and complete the Integration Work Program of MERCOSUR. To 
support the seamless implementation of the future EU-MERCOSUR Association 
Agreement”34. The strategic framework for the European Commission’s 
cooperation with MERCOSUR intends to improve the institutional framework 
and mechanisms for detection and prevention of SPS, among others. Thus, 
through these actions, the EU aims to focus the aid provided in the regional 
strategy to pave the way to improve the present conditions so that the future 
Agreement between the two blocs is as successful as possible and that it is 
adapted to the demands of the European bloc. 
3.2.2. Legal Regulations
Another key area related to food security, also within the scope of 
the Agreement, are the measures and requirements related to intellectual 
property. One of the most contentious one, particularly by small farmers and 
indigenous communities, are those related to the protection and privatization 
of seeds. These seeds in many cases were acquired through traditional 
knowledge through the crossing of species between ancestral communities, 
which today see how large corporations are privatizing them. This is the case 
of the International Union for the Protection of New Plant Varieties (UPOV). 
This intergovernmental organization, through its agreements, aims to “[p]
rovide and promote an effective system for the protection of new varieties 
[...] for the granting of an intellectual property right”35. In practice, this implies 
that farmers and indigenous communities of the signatory countries must 
respect the rules when it comes to the use of seeds. These rules force them 
to prevent from reusing and exchanging seeds and forcing them to buy new 
ones in each harvest. Otherwise, the breach may result in penalties as well as 
33 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Documento estratégico regional 2007-2013 [Online]. Brussels: 
s.n, 2007. (Strategic Document European Commission), p. 5. Available at: <http://eeas.europa.
eu/archives/docs/mercosur/rsp/07_13_es.pdf>
34 Idem, p. 34.
35 MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES, UNIÓN EUROPEA Y COOPERACIÓN DE ESPAÑA. 
UPOV. Available at: <http://www.exteriores.gob.es/RepresentacionesPermanentes/
OficinadelasNacionesUnidas/es/quees2/Paginas/Convenios%20y%20otras%20
Organizaciones%20Internacionales/UPOV.aspx>
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prison in some cases. In other words, a subsistence farmer who produces for 
his family and does not buy the seeds in the market and pays the intellectual 
property fee will face severe legal consequences.
The Agreement in Principle does not lag behind in this context and 
incorporates in its chapter number 13, “Intellectual and industrial property 
rights”, the duty of the parties to protect the intellectual property rights of 
plant varieties in accordance with the UPOV 91 agreement. The objective of 
this measure is to strengthen the national legal framework of the signatory 
countries in order to penalize some practices by rural communities such as the 
free use of seeds for their crops. Furthermore, these practices are reinforced 
by the Agreement through more demanding legal frameworks to identify and 
punish these cases36. For instance, one of the reasons for delaying the entry 
into force of the EU-CAAA (the European Union Central American Association 
Agreement) agreement, signed in 2012, was due to geographical indications 
(GIs)37. This clause is included within the chapter on intellectual property and 
results in an obligation for the parties to respect the designations of origin of 
the countries. Parties must introduce in their domestic legislation measures 
that regulate the use of names registered with the designation of origin. 
This has led to serious consequences in the commercialization of products 
in Central America after the approval of the agreement. Products that were 
previously marketed under names like Mozzarella or Manchego, must change 
their names38. In the case of the EU-MERCOSUR Agreement, there are a total 
of 355 products protected by a European GI, while the EU will safeguard a 
total of 220 GIs from MErcosUr39. In addition, expressions such as “type”, 
“style”, “imitation” or the like will also be prohibited. For example, “Chaco 
type meat”40. 
Another element that undermines the sovereignty of countries is the 
ability of trade and association agreements to complement and shape the 
legal power of countries and establish new rules that benefit the market and 
protect commercial interests. In Chapter 4 of the principle agreement entitled 
“Trade defense instruments”, it is mandatory that if any of the parties intends 
to impose safeguard measures, the party will endeavor to impose them in 
a way that affects bilateral trade the least41. Countries must be respectful 
36 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Intellectual Property Chapter [online]. Brussels: s.n, 2019. (Texts 
of the Trade Part of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement). Available at: <https://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/september/tradoc_158329.pdf>
37 SICE. Acuerdo de Asociación Centroamérica-Unión Europea. Available at: <http://www.sice.
oas.org/Trade/CACM_EU/Text_Sept14/Index_s.asp>
38 “Crónica de un queso: su camino a ser denominación de origen y retos a enfrentar”. 
Mercosur. 2019. Available at: <http://www.marcasur.com/noticia.php?NoNoId=5021>
39 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Annex 1, Legislation of the parties [online]. Brussels: s.n, 2019. 
(Annex for the Texts of the Trade Part of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement). Available 
at: <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/september/tradoc_158330.pdf>
40 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Intellectual Property Chapter [online]. Brussels: s.n, 2019. (Texts 
of the Trade Part of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement). Available at: <https://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/september/tradoc_158329.pdf>
41 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Trade defense and global safeguards [online]. Brussels: s.n, 2019. 
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of bilateral trade, prioritizing commercial interests over the interests of 
the governments. This is reinforced in the chapter on bilateral safeguard 
measures where it is established that, if it is finally concluded that there 
was no such damage, any economic measure imposed must be immediately 
reimbursed42. All these measures aim to provide security to private sector 
investments, which are mainly promoted by large companies and where the 
figure of the smallest and most vulnerable sectors is neglected.
In this Agreement, the parties have been interested in negotiating for 
control over food producers and handlers in order to ensure the adoption of 
sufficient requirements and standards along with a strong institutionalization 
that is capable of implementing them. As a result, food security has been 
relegated to trade facilitation so that sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
are respected, also to the inclusion of clauses and regulations that respect 
measures or requirements imposed by the international trade framework. 
These actions are only aimed at protecting the health of consumers, 
especially Europeans, by requiring MErcosUr countries to comply with the 
high standards of food safety and health that the EU imposes on imports. 
This is directly related only to one of the dimensions of the food security 
according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), which is the dimension of food utilization, however, in a less subtle 
and more collateral way, the agreement in principle establishes norms 
and requirements that may affect the 4 dimensions of food security of the 
signatory countries. This is the case of the rules on intellectual property 
compliance and the UPOV 91 agreement, which can force rural communities 
with traditional production methods to pay for seeds that they will not be 
able to reuse or exchange in future harvests. However, the official content 
of the cooperation and political pillars remains to be known where this issue 
should be addressed in greater depth and in all its dimensions.
By way of conclusion, the liberalization of markets and globalization 
lead to drastic changes to which the most vulnerable populations are not 
able to adapt with the same ease as the large economies and their defense 
mechanisms. In addition, some clauses included in the agreements, as in 
the one outlined here, undermine the sovereignty of countries by adding 
obligations and clauses to national regulations. These changes and obligations 
cause mismatches that can lead to weakening the food security. In addition, 
the global food system fed by this new reality, causes the problems with food 
security that were previously focused and had a reduced field of affectation, 
now become international priorities with global effects.
(Texts of the Trade Part of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement). Available at: <https://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_158157.%20Trade%20Defense%20-%20
General%20Principles%20and%20Global%20Safeguards.pdf>
42 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Bilateral safeguard measures [online]. Brussels: s.n, 2019. 
(Texts of the Trade Part of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement). Available at: <https://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_158158.%20Trade%20Defense%20-%20
Bilateral%20Safeguards.pdf>
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4. LABOR REGULATIONS 
4.1. EU-MERCOSUR Labor Provisions
Labor rights were not considered in the first EU free trade agreements. 
However, since the late 1990s, there has been a change of approach. In its FTA 
with South Africa (1999), the EU included for the first time labor standards. 
From the mid-2000s, this approach has been reinforced and consolidated. 
The Treaty of Lisbon constitutes a step forward in the promotion of core labor 
standards through the EU external relations policies43. Its agreement with the 
CARIFORUM (2008) introduced a monitoring process on the application and 
respect of the core labor standards. All the FTAs concluded afterwards - South 
Korea (2010), Peru and Colombia (2011) - include core labor standards and a 
procedure to guarantee their implementation and monitoring44.
The Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the 
then European Community and MERCOSUR (1995), makes explicit references 
to the protection of fundamental labor rights. Firstly, the third recital sets 
out that “both integration processes are instruments for the economic and 
‘social’ development”. In the same vein, one of the objectives of Article 10.1 
is to “establish conditions conducive to job creation and job quality”. Even 
more importantly, Article 10.7 refers to the necessity of the promotion of 
fundamental social rights. This agreement is not only important because it 
has been the framework of the negotiations, but also it has contributed to 
the development of the internal labor dimension of MErcosUr45.
This has been reinforced by the current EU-MERCOSUR political 
agreement46, which - similar to the new generation agreements and influenced 
by the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalisation (2018) and 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015) - sets out three types 
of measures47. Firstly, the agreement has a substantive dimension, which 
enshrines some social policy norms and ILO Core Labor Standards (Article 4). 
Specifically, the agreement relies upon the 1998 ILO Declaration on the Core 
Labor Standards: Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining (ILO Conventions 87 and 98); the elimination of 
forced labor (ILO Conventions 29 and 105); the abolition of child labor (ILO 
Conventions 138 and 182); and the elimination of discrimination in respect 
43 PERULLI, Adalberto, “Fundamental Social Rights, Market Regulation and EU External 
Action”. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations. 2014, vol 
30, n° 1, p. 27, 40.
44 GSTOHL, Sieglinde and HANF, Dominik. Op. cit., p. 742.
45  MANSUETI, Hugo. Derecho del Trabajo en el Mercosur. Buenos Aires: Ciudad Argentina,1999. 
p. 92; PUCHETA, Mauro. “Regional Integration and Labour Law: A Comparative Analysis of the 
EU and Mercosur”. Orientador: Jeff Kenner. University of Nottingham. Nottingham, 2019.
46 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Trade and Sustainable Development [online]. Brussels: s.n, 
2019. (Texts of the Trade Part of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement). Available at: 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_158166.%20Trade%20and%20
Sustainable%20Development.pdf>
47 VAN DE PUTTE, Lore and ORBIE, Jan. “EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising 
Rise of Labour Provisions”. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations. 2015, vol 31, n° 3, p. 263, 268-269.
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of employment and occupation (ILO Conventions 100 and 111). The EU-
MErcosUr agreement has gone further and has included new references to 
ILO Conventions such as health and safety of workers (ILO Conventions 155 and 
7), labor inspection (ILO Conventions 81 and 129), and discrimination against 
migrants (ILO Convention 143). Furthermore, the agreement prescribes that 
Parties have an obligation to uphold levels of protection. This means that 
they cannot lower not de jure or de facto domestic labor law (regulations) in 
order to enhance their competitiveness (Article 2). 
secondly, procedural norms have been included in order to guarantee 
their implementation by the parties. There are two general procedures that aim 
to ensure the implementation of labor provisions. Domestically, a Domestic 
Advisory Group (DAG) - composed of NGOs, business, trade unions - has been 
conceived in order to ensure the participation of the local civil society in this 
process. Transnationally, a Parties’ Sub-committee on Trade and Sustainable 
Development has been created in order to oversee the implementation of this 
chapter (Article 14). It has also created a joint Civil Society Forum where DAGs 
and/or other civil society actors can interact. Furthermore, the agreement 
enshrines two special procedures. As the other generations’ agreements that 
recognize the possibility of governments’ representatives to settle issues in 
an amicable government consultations procedure (Article 16). On top of that, 
the new generation agreement conceives a Panel of Experts that can issue a 
non-legally binding final report and recommendations to the Parties, which 
should implement its conclusions (Article 17). Although it is a step forward, 
this has been criticized because the EU has adopted a “soft” incentives-
based approach unlike the “hard” sanctions-based approach adopted by the 
US.48 No sanctions can be imposed on the non-compliant party, such as the 
suspensions of trade preferences against the other party.49 The weakness of 
this enforcement system has undermined the confidence of civil society and 
other stakeholders such as trade unions50. Furthermore, the EU has been 
reluctant to use the dispute resolution mechanism. This has led to papers 
from the European Parliament, trade unions, NGOs, and a response of the 
European Commission in order to overcome these institutional challenges51. 
It has been suggested that a private complaints procedure which would allow 
social partners to bring complaints, could constitute a desirable solution52.
Thirdly, a governance dimension has been created in order to ensure 
the implementation of labor provisions. On the one hand, some provisions 
on corporate social responsibility have been enacted in order to encourage 
48 Idem, p. 263, 270; HARRISON, James et al. “Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade 
Agreements: Reflections on the European Commission’s Reform Agenda”. World Trade Review. 
2019, vol 18, n° 4, p. 635, 641.
49 HARRISON, James et al. “Labour Standards Provisions …”, p, 641.
50 BRONCKERS, Marco and GRUNI, Giovanni. “Taking the Enforcement of Labour Standards in 
the EU’s Free Trade Agreements Seriously”. 2019, vol 56, n° 6, p. 1591, 1592.
51 See: HARRISON, James. “The Labour Rights Agenda in Free Trade Agreements”. Journal of 
World Investment & Trade. 2019, n° 20, p. 705, 714, 720-721.
52 See: BRONCKERS, Marco and GRUNI, Giovanni. Op. cit., p. 1591.
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companies to comply with social standards, particularly in the management 
of supply chains (Article 11). Similarly, civil society actors, such as trade 
unions and business organizations, can take part in the discussions regarding 
social issues that may arise under the FTA. Given the rather poor results of 
the procedural system previously described, cooperation mechanisms can 
constitute a good device for promoting labor standards53. This is all the more 
the case in MERCOSUR where social partners - particularly in Argentina and 
Brazil - are key actors in the implementation of labor standards. Criticisms 
have been pointed out, though, to cooperative mechanisms given the lack 
of systematic implementation and assessment of cooperative activities54. 
Therefore, it will be critical that both parties ensure that civil society actors 
play a prominent role in the implementation of the Trade and Sustainable 
Development Chapter.
4.2. The Possible Reforms at the MERCOSUR Labor Dimension 
Depending upon the final text and the intention of the parties, the EU-
MErcosUr agreement can have a threefold impact upon MErcosUr and its 
Member States labor dimension: firstly, it may contribute to enforcement of 
the Socio-Labor Declaration. Secondly, par ricochet, it could be the legal basis 
to challenge the current trade union systems of Argentina and Brazil. Thirdly, 
it may help to reduce informality in the region. 
Relying upon a myriad of international human rights instruments and 
the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work - 
which enshrines core four fundamental rights: freedom of association and 
the right to organize and bargain collectively; prohibition of forced labor; 
eradication of child labor; and, equality of treatment and non-discrimination 
in employment - MERCOSUR adopted in 1998 the Socio-Labor Declaration, 
recently revisited in 2015. This instrument protects fundamental labor rights 
within MERCOSUR and its Member States legal orders. It guarantees the 
protection of individual labor rights such as non-discrimination (Article 4), 
equal treatment between men and women and disabled workers (Articles 5 
and 6), equal treatment principle of foreign workers with national workers 
(Article 7), elimination of forced labor (Article 8), child labor (Article 9), 
working time (Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14), and protection against unfair 
dismissal (Article 15). It also enshrines collective rights such as freedom of 
association (Article 16), right to collective bargaining (Article 17), right to strike 
(Article 18), promotion and development of alternative dispute resolution 
systems of industrial conflicts (Article 19), social dialogue (Article 20). The 
Socio-Labor Declaration has undoubtedly been a watershed moment in the 
MErcosUr labor dimension55. However, given the intergovernmental nature 
53 See: EBERT, Franz. “Labour provisions in EU trade agreements: What potential for 
channelling labour standards-related capacity building?”. International Labour Review. 2016, 
vol 155, n° 3, p. 407, 412-413.
54 HARRISON, James et al. “Labour Standards Provisions…”, p. 645.
55 CASTELLO, Alejandro. “Revisión y Actualización de la Declaración Sociolaboral del 
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of MERCOSUR, its implementation has heavily relied upon Member States56. 
In this respect, the EU-MERCOSUR Agreement may reinforce the importance 
and enforcement of the Socio-Labor Declaration at the regional and national 
levels. The Sustainable Trade Chapter contains specific provisions regarding 
fundamental labor rights - that are in line with the content of the Socio-Labor 
Declaration - which the EU intends to uphold. Specifically, the role of the 
Socio-Labor Commission, which is in charge of monitoring the enforcement 
and development of the Socio-Labor Declaration, could be reinforced either 
through procedural and/or cooperation mechanisms enshrined in the 
agreement. This remains to be seen, though, depending upon the signature 
of a free trade agreement and how keen the EU is in enforcing this chapter. 
In this area, the use of the procedural avenues as well as the cooperation 
mechanisms will be vital to enforce these fundamental labor rights57.
Secondly, the EU-MERCOSUR agreement could be an element of 
pressure to the reform of the Brazilian trade union system. Brazil has adopted 
a system of “unicidade sindical”58 whereby only one trade union can be 
created in a specific sector in the same territory59. This is partially at odds with 
the principle of freedom of association, guaranteed by the EU-MERCOSUR 
agreement (Article 4) for two reasons. Firstly, it makes the adoption of 
a democratic trade union system difficult, given the excessive powers 
granted to one specific trade union. Secondly, the state enjoys too much 
power in regulating and registering trade unions’ activities60. Unsurprisingly, 
Brazil has not ratified the ILO Convention 87. However, the Socio-Labor 
Declaration guarantees the protection of freedom of association as well as 
collective bargaining, and the right to take collective action (Articles 16, 17 
and 18), These provisions rely heavily upon the ILO Conventions 87 and 98. 
consequently, it has been argued that the current unicidade sindical system 
has been indirectly modified through the adoption of the Declaration, which 
is hierarchically superior to ordinary laws61. Though, this has not entailed any 
practical changes. Although it has been argued that the EU may have some 
insufficient political influence to induce certain policy changes - such as in 
the Korean case62, it could push Brazil to ratify the ILO Convention 87 in order 
to fully guarantee freedom of association within the biggest trade partner of 
Mercosur”. Derecho Laboral. 2015, n° 260, p. 637, 645.
56 PUCHETA, Mauro, Op.cit.
57 See: EBERT, Franz. Op. cit., p. 407.
58 BRAZIL. 1988 Constitution, Article 8, II.
59 See: GODINHO DELGADO, Mauricio. “Constitución de la República, Sistema Laboral 
Brasileño y Derecho Colectivo del Trabajo”. Derecho Laboral. 2015, nº LVII (259) , p. 350.
60 See: FERRAZ HAZAN, Bruno. “A incompatibilidade do modelo a partir da incorporação 
brasileira dos parâmetros da liberdade sindical”. Revista de Direito & Desenvolvimento da 
UniCatólica. 2019, vol 2, n° 1, p. 26.
61 CASTELLO, Alejandro. Op. cit., p. 647; FERRAZ HAZAN, Bruno. Op. cit., p. 39.
62 HARRISON, James et al. “Governing Labour Standards through Free Trade Agreements: 
Limits to the European Union’s Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters”. Journal of 
Common Market Studies. 2019, vol 57, n° 2, p. 260, 271.
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MERCOSUR. As put forward by the European Parliament in the Vietnamese 
case, this could be done as a “pre-ratification conditionality” in order to 
ensure the respect of labor standards before the signature of the FTA63.
Thirdly, informal work is a structural problem in South America. 
Argentina and Brazil are not the exception. By the end of 2018, Argentina 
had 49.3% of its workforce in the informal economy64, while in June of 2019 
Brazil had 41.3% of their workers in the same situation65. This is crucial to 
guarantee the protection of fundamental labor rights. A high number of 
workers in the informal economy have several negative consequences 
upon them. Firstly, it facilitates high turnover rates, which has resulted in 
a ‘reserve army of informal workers [that] facilitates quick replacement of 
laid-off workers’66. This puts pressures on wages and employment conditions, 
which are diminished67. Furthermore, it has had an impact on the training 
system and the development of the skill regimes. Incentives tend to be much 
lower in the informal sector68. Another negative consequence has been the 
lack of representation of a significant universe of workers, which are not 
covered by the existing legal framework69. Tackling informal work could also 
have a positive impact in terms of inequality. Access to welfare benefits is 
usually tied to formal employment. Therefore, greater protection coverage, 
as well as the development of a better enforcement system, could also have 
contributed to the reduction of inequality70. ILO has recommended the 
development of more and better enforcement as well as the development 
of social dialogue71. The development of a professional labor inspectorate is 
essential to uphold workers’ rights as recognized in the ILO Recommendation 
205 on the transition from the informal to the formal economy, specifically in 
section VI (“incentives, compliance and enforcement”). It is possible to see a 
clear correlation between the strengthening of national labor inspectorates 
in the region, particularly in Brazil and Uruguay – Argentina to a lesser extent 
63 BRONCKERS, Marco and GRUNI, Giovanni. Op. cit., 1596; HARRISON, James et al. “Labour 
Standards Provisions…”, p. 650.
64 CASTELLO, Eduardo, “Heterogeneidad y Fragmentación del Mercado de Trabajo (2010-
2018)”. Informe, 2019, p. 13. - 49.3 % In June 2019. See: <http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/
downloads/estadisticas/Reporte_Laboral_Junio_2019.pdf>
65 SILVEIRA, Daniel & ALVARENGA, Darlan, “Trabalho informal avança para 41,3% da população 
ocupada e atinge nível recorde, diz IBGE”. Report, 30 Augsut 2019, <https://g1.globo.com/
economia/noticia/2019/08/30/trabalho-informal-avanca-para-413percent-da-populacao-
ocupada-e-atinge-nivel-recorde-diz-ibge.ghtml>
66 ROSS SCHNEIDER, Ben and KARCHER, Sebastian Karcher. “Complementarities and 
continuities in the political economy of labour markets in Latin America”. Socio-Economic 
Review. 2010, n° 8, p. 623, 636.
67 COOK, Maria Lorena. The Politics of Labor Reform in Latin America. Between Flexibility and 
Rights. Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 2007, p. 45-46.
68 ROSS SCHNEIDER, Ben and KARCHER, Sebastian Karcher. Op. cit., p. 636.
69 Ídem, p. 640.
70 BENSUSÁN, Graciela. “Labour law, inclusive development and equality in Latin America”. In: 
MARSHALL, Shelley Marshall and FENWICK, Colin (eds.). Labour regulation and development. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016, p. 175.
71 ILO. Labour Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean 12-19, 2016. 
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– and the growth of formal workers in the labor market72. In this respect, 
the EU-MERCOSUR agreement may play an important role. Unlike other 
previous agreements, this one prescribes expressly that Parties should pay 
particular attention to, amongst other, “labor inspection in particular through 
effective implementation of relevant ILO standards on labor inspections 
labor” (Article 4). The EU has a particular interest because the reduction of 
informal workers could guarantee a relatively level playing field between the 
EU and MERCOSUR Member States. In this respect, the Domestic Advisory 
Groups and civil society actors, such as trade unions may also constitute key 
actors in putting pressure upon national governments in order to ensure the 
enforcement of national labor laws. 
CONCLUSION
The FTA between the EU and MErcosUr will have important legal 
consequences and will undoubtedly, if ratified, entail legal reforms. As it has 
been underlined, the EU regulatory power goes beyond the internal legal 
consequences that affect the EU Member States. This normative power 
triggers legal consequences in the relations with third countries or regional 
blocs, as it is the case of MERCOSUR. The EU can therefore be considered a 
true foreign policy actor, driven by self-declared normative principles that 
affect its global partners such as MERCOSUR. The deal reached between the 
EU and MERCOSUR announced on the occasion of the G20 Summit in Osaka 
in 2019 was a result of twenty years of negotiations. There are several steps 
ahead: the draft association agreement will have to be signed and ratified 
by the European Council, the European Parliament, MERCOSUR and national 
parliaments.
International trade is, as a matter of principle, a key element in achieving 
global food security, which is one of the key areas of the Agreement. This is 
due to the productive specialization of those countries with the necessary 
resources and abilities, which are capable of offering a greater quantity of 
production at competitive prices. This allows for greater global access and 
availability. However, there are still collateral damages and direct effects of 
the signing of agreements that affect the inequalities and food insecurity of 
the most disadvantaged population. 
If the Agreement is ratified, the signing countries will be “forced” 
to adapt to new regulations and mechanisms. The UPOV91 agreement 
that privatizes the use of seeds in case of subsistence farming, and the 
reinforcement of mechanisms for the protection of abusive practices of 
international trade against the States, along with geographical indications, 
will shape the regulatory framework of these countries and will have effects 
on their citizens. Some of these additions will benefit the large producing and 
exporting companies, leaving aside most of the producers and communities 
that support food security in their countries. The pillars of cooperation and 
72 BENSUSÁN, Graciela. Op.cit., p. 175.
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political dialogue emerge to reduce these uneven effects, but the texts have 
not yet been published.
MERCOSUR’s external policy has traditionally addressed exclusively 
trade matters. In contrast, since the early 2000s, the EU external policy 
has included consistently labor standards on its FTAs. Unsurprisingly, the 
EU-MERCOSUR Agreement includes a Trade and Sustainable Development 
Chapter, which enshrines labor standards. Three types of measures are 
adopted in this Agreement to guarantee their protection and enforcement: 
firstly, substantive measures, which under the auspices of new agreements, 
guarantee the protection of the 1998 ILO Core Labor Standards: freedom 
of association, forced labor, child labor, and non-discrimination. It has also 
gone further and has included health and safety of workers, labor inspection, 
and discrimination against migrants. Secondly, procedural measures are 
adopted to ensure the implementation of such labor standards. Drawing 
upon a “promotional” approach, the amicable government consultations 
and the panel of experts is in charge of the interpretation of labor standards. 
However, unlike the US “conditional” approach, no trade sanctions can be 
imposed on the other party. This has reduced the confidence of civil society 
actors. Greater powers to private parties such as trade unions could improve 
this system. Thirdly, a governance dimension has been included in order to 
guarantee the participation of governments and civil society actors through 
formal channels in implementing labor standards. It has been argued that 
this could constitute a suitable avenue for civil society actors to influence and 
put pressure on the other Parties.
The final text of the Agreement remains to be seen. However, at 
this stage, it is possible to shape the MErcosUr labor dimension in three 
ways: firstly, it may contribute to a better enforcement of the Socio-Labor 
Declaration, specifically through the reinforcement of the Socio-Labor 
Commission. Secondly, it can put pressure on Brazil, the biggest MERCOSUR 
player, to ratify ILO Convention 87. Thirdly, it can help MERCOSUR Member 
States reduce informal work.
The COVID-19 crisis and the challenges that globalization and 
interregional trade agreements may face in the aftermath of this period will 
shape the EU-MERCOSUR agreement and its final content. Therefore, its final 
impact upon food, security, and labor regulations remains to be seen.
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•••••
Medidas de segurança alimentar e regulamentação trabalhista no 
Acordo UE-MERCOSUL: uma visão geral dos desafios legais
Resumo: Em junho de 2019, a União Europeia e o MERCOSUL concordaram 
em assinar um amplo acordo de livre comércio (TLC). Seu objetivo é 
aumentar o comércio inter-regional e desenvolver a cooperação em áreas 
não comerciais, como segurança alimentar e regulamentação trabalhista. A 
UE tem um poder regulador através do qual aspira exportar seus valores e 
padrões para o resto do planeta. Portanto, após a ratificação deste acordo, 
o MERCOSUL e, portanto, seus Estados membros serão forçados a reformar 
seus sistemas legais. A segurança alimentar pode levar os Estados membros 
do MERCOSUL a se alinharem com certos regulamentos internacionais, 
como a União Internacional para a Proteção de Novas Variedades de Plantas 
(UPOV). Também pode afetar as regulamentações relacionadas à propriedade 
intelectual. Os regulamentos trabalhistas constituem outro aspecto essencial 
dos interesses não comerciais deste acordo. Para evitar o dumping social, a 
UE pode exigir que os Estados membros do MERCOSUL ratifiquem certas 
convenções da OIT, como a 87 - que ainda não foi ratificada pelo Brasil - 
para garantir condições equitativas. Como o texto final está atualmente em 
negociação, o impacto deste acordo dependerá em grande parte da vontade 
política das partes.
Palavras-chave: União Europeia, MERCOSUL, segurança alimentar, 
regulamentação trabalhista, Acordo de Livre Comércio (ALC).
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